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ABSTRACf. The U.S. Bureau of Mines was established in
1910 to reduce .the high accident rate in the nation's coal
mines. For 85 years, it conducted a wide variety of tasks
related to mining before it was abolished in 1995. The BOM
had many technology transfer successes in its lifetime, includ-
ing more than a dozen "R&D100" awards. This essay identi-
fies and discusses five "transfer factors" that can explain the
success (or failure) of many Bureau of Mines projects. These
five factors are termed "pressure, pitfalls, path, price, and
profit."
technology transfer successes and failures of its
mining research program.
The major technological accomplishments of
the BOM were identified in a report by the
National Research Council (NRC, 1990). Starting
in 1970, these were: (1) more complete coalbed
extraction technologies, (2) coal mine illumina-
tion, (3) methane drainage, (4) self-contained
self-rescuers, and (5) respirable dust control. I
examined the characteristics of these five accom-
plishments along with several dozen other tech-
nology transfer successes to generalize about key
"transfer factors"-those factors that influenced
the technology transfer success of specific pro-
jects.
The Bureau of Mines (BOM), a federal govern-
ment agency, was established in 1910 to reduce
the high accident rate in the nation's coal mines.
The BOM conducted a wide variety of tasks re-
lated to mining for 85 years. Although abolished
in 1995, the BOM had considerable success with
technology transfer during its lifetime. For exam-
ple, in recent years the Pittsburgh Laboratory
alone won 14 Research&Development"R&D100"
awards and 6 Pollution Engineering "PE 5STAR"
awards. Given the size of the Pittsburgh lab bud-
get, this record is as good as the best research
laboratories in the nation. Over the 85-year life-
time of the BOM, the mining accident rate signif-
icantly improved, progress that no doubt con-
tributed to the unfortunate demise of the organi-
zation. However there are few events entirely
devoid of opportunity, and the demise of the
BOM presents the chance for a frank and open
review of those factors that contributed to the
1. Transfer factors
An analysis of BOM projects reveals five factors
that create both opportunities and barriers to
successful technology transfer. These transfer fac-
tors are:
.Pressure-financial or legal pressure from ex-
ternal sources.
.Pitfalls-problems that seem obvious in hind-
sight.
.Path-the length of the path necessary to
transfer the technology.
.Price-the cost of the technology-
.Profit-how much the user can profit by using
the technology.
Each of these is discussed in more detail below.
Pressure.- External pressure was the first fac-
tor that influenced whether project results were
used by the mining industry. This pressure came
from many different sources, the most effective
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When the result of research is a technique and
not a product, the chance of technology transfer
success was always higher for BOM projects be-
cause the path was shorter. For example, two of
the five major accomplishments listed by the NRC
were methane drainage and respirable dust con-
trol. Both were techniques. In the case of methane
drainage, if a mine operator wished to drain
methane from his coalbed, he only needed to hire
a driller. That driller followed a procedure that
started in BOM research-where to drill the hole,
what diameter, how deep, how to case it, what
fracture treatments were necessary, and so on. In
respirable dust control, the research was directed
toward simple techniques that mines could carry
out themselves.
Other BOM technology transfer successes in-
volving techniques included engineering tools
{such as expert systems or ventilation software), a
coal mine roof rating system, a test procedure to
measure the gas in coal, criteria for evaluation of
explosion-proof seals, strategies for deployment
of carbon monoxide sensors, and a new conveyor
belt flammability test.
This success with techniques can be contrasted
with the success the BOM had in developing
instrumentation products. In the 1970's, the BOM
funded a contract to develop a dust monitor based
on forward light scattering. The result was GCA
Corporation's RAM-I monitor, a commercially
successful product. However, there have been
many that were not so successful-a diesel-dis-
criminating fire smoke detector, a very novel car-
bon monoxide detector, and a remote methane
sensor. The BOM even had its own rock dust
meter that did not use radiation but still was not
used.
This lack of success with instrumentation oc-
curred for several reasons. One was a perceived
lack of a market in the eyes of prospective manu-
facturers. Equipment purchases in a commodity-
based industry like coal are often made to lower
the overall cost of doing business; for example, a
health and safety product purchase should result
in lower health and safety costs. In the eyes of
prospective manufacturers, many BOM instru-
mentation products simply did not meet this mar-
ket test. Other important factors for prospective
being financial or legal. Two of the five accom-
plishments from the NRC report were coal mine
illumination and self-contained self-rescuers. Both
were required by coal mine health and safety
legislation. (In a heavily regulated industry like
mining, some impact of government regulations is
never far away.)
Mine air monitoring systems developed by the
BOM provide another example of how external
pressure can promote technology transfer. These
are electronic systems that monitor the quantity
and quality of ventilation air. Since mine safety
laws allow the use of substitute technologies that
improve safety, mine operators used monitoring
systems to gain relief from manpower-intensive
activities such as checking for explosive gas.
Pitfalls.- The second transfer factor is the
need to avoid pitfalls that come from not doing
the necessary homework. For example, a mining
research organization in Europe recently devel-
oped a rock dust meter that gives the percentage
of rock in the dust lying on the coal mine floor.
This percentage is important to know because it
changes the explosivity of the dust. Unfortu-
nately, this rock dust meter contained a radiation
source. Because of regulations on radiation, it
meant that every coal mine wishing to use the
meter had to hire a new person responsible for
radiation safety. You can imagine what happened.
Relatedly, some BOM projects did not consider
infrastructure needs. For example, in the 1970s
BOM developed underground communications
systems two or three generations beyond those in
use, and for which most mines had no infrastruc-
ture to service and maintain. Failure to consider
such technology transfer pitfalls was a major bar-
rier to the implementation of many research pro-
jects.
Path Length.-Path length is the third key
factor that can affect technology success. This
factor represents the length of the path necessary
to transfer the technology. The two basic paths
are those that lead to a technique and those that
lead to a product. The rock dust meter and mine
communications systems were products. These in-
novations required a longer path-involving the
participation of an intermediate party, a manufac-
turer-between the government and the user.
comes from coalbeds. That is a major technology
transfer success.
Much less successful was the BOM effort to
build a hydrogen-powered shuttle car. A shuttle
car is a truck-like vehicle that carries coal from
the mining machine to the conveyor belt system.
Most shuttle cars are powered by electric motors
-perhaps 10 percent are diesel-powered. The
diesels emit soot that could be a health hazard
but there were no regulations limiting soot.
Adoption by the industry would have required the
manufacture and sale of an expensive product
without any clear productivity benefits. There was
no infrastructure for the distribution of large
quantities of hydrogen, let alone transporting it
down a mine shaft several miles to where the
shuttle cars operate. While the emissions from a
hydrogen-fueled engine are harmless, there were
many safety concerns about the storage and han-
dling of hydrogen. In summary, there was no
pressure to use a hydrogen-powered shuttle car.
It was a $250,000 product loaded with pitfalls and
offering no productivity increases.
2. Conclusions
manufacturers were the size of the investment
required and a perceived lack of adequate protec-
tion from patents and exclusive licenses.
Price.-Price was the fourth factor that influ-
enced whether a BOM technology got used. In
the BOM dust control program where I worked,
price was the major factor. There was external
pressure from government regulations, and most
dust control developments were techniques rather
than products. With those two considerations
aside, what was adopted by industry depended on
the cost. This included purchase and operating
costs. For example, we had no success with high
pressure (1000 psi) water sprays as a technique
for dust control. Our research showed that high
pressure sprays lowered dust by 40 percent. How-
ever, the downside was a $150,000 price tag, some
operating problems, and a possible safety hazard
from high pressure hoses.
Protit.-The cost issue has another side that
represents the fifth transfer factor-profit. If the
BOM devised a safety product or technique that
was likely to raise productivity and increase prof-
its, then the likelihood of implementation went
way up. For example, in the 1970s the BOM
developed a dust scrubber for continuous mining
machines. This device lowered the amount of dust
produced by the machine by 90 percent or more.
Although it found some use, widespread applica-
tion lagged for a decade until mine operators
discovered that a dust scrubber permitted changes
in the mining cycle that yielded a 5-10 percent
gain in productivity. Today, most continuous min-
ing machines have a dust scrubber.
It is instructive to examine two projects that
represent the opposite ends of the success spec-
trum. One of the most successful BOM research
projects was methane drainage; that is, the re-
moval of methane gas from coalbeds before it
escapes into the mine air. The National Research
Council cited its success. Mining engineers from
other countries laud it. The transfer factors were
positive. For example, there was pressure to degas
coalbeds because methane gas in many deep
mines was creating an explosion hazard. The re-
search resulted in techniques rather than prod-
ucts. Finally, tapping this source and selling the
gas offered the chance of profit. Today, 5 percent
of natural gas production in the United States
These experiences of the BOM are not particu-
larly novel. Twenty years ago, A.D. Little con-
ducted a study of six prominent federal programs
of the early 1970s-nuclear power, coal combus-
tion, motor vehicle safety, urban mass transporta-
tion, soy protein, and biological pesticides. Four
of the six were rated poorly, but the study report
did point out that successful commercialization of
federally funded-R&D is nearly always accom-
panied by public policy measures that cause or
stimulate market demand.
However, the experience of the Bureau of
Mines illustrates that these market demand forces,
expressed more specifically as transfer factors,
operate even at a small project level scale. In
hindsight, when transfer factors are considered, it
is not difficult to see why the winning projects
won and the losing projects lost. Researchers who
consider pressure, pitfalls, path, price, and profit
in selecting their project work enjoy a more suc-
cessful career than those who do not.
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